Beyond Broadcasts: How MMR Is Being Rewritten in the Post-House Era
- Nick Briggs
- 4 hours ago
- 7 min read

When Judge Claudia Wilken approved the $2.8 billion House v. NCAA settlement in June 2025, she formally ushered in a new reality: universities can now pay athletes directly, capped initially at $20.5 million per school in year one.[2] That seismic change has been heralded as the “end of amateurism” and the true beginning of a semi-professionalized model of college sports.[3] But beneath this financial realignment exists another development: the rebirth of Multimedia Rights ("MMR") as the legal and business framework for name, image, and likeness ("NIL") and revenue sharing converge.[4]
Colleel
Traditionally, MMR agreements allowed third-party companies like Learfield, Playfly, or JMI Sports to monetize everything not tied to television contracts.[5] This included stadium signage, radio rights, licensing, and sponsorships.[6] These deals, often structured as either guaranteed payments or revenue-sharing models, underwrote athletic budgets by leveraging school branding inventory.[7] But in the wake of revenue sharing and new compliance scrutiny, MMR is being reimagined as the connective tissue, so to speak, linking institutional revenue, athlete NIL, and sponsor interests.[8]
Blueprint’s NIL/MMR Hybrid
Perhaps no company illustrates this shift better than Blueprint Sports.[9] Once a backend operator for NIL collectives, Blueprint has pivoted to signing school-wide consulting contracts that look strikingly like MMR deals.[10] Their recent agreement with Oregon State University included a baseline fundraising target, revenue-sharing thresholds, and even an “administration fee” for NIL payments, which are all terms that mirror classic MMR structures.[11]
Legally, these arrangements raise some questions. By incorporating NIL dealmaking into MMR-style contracts, Blueprint blurs the line between third-party collective work and institutional revenue functions.[12] What this means is that schools gain oversight powers, including audit rights and compliance review, while Blueprint seemingly assumes risk and operational responsibility.[13] In effect, NIL management is being folded into the same legal and contractual frameworks that once governed stadium signage and radio advertisements.[14]
The compliance angle here cannot be overstated. Blueprint’s contracts require NIL deals to fall within a market-based “band” set by the College Sports Commission ("CSC"), which is a regulatory guardrail designed to withstand fair-market-value scrutiny under the House regime.[15] This safeguard shows that MMR contracts, once purely commercial, are now subject to quasi-regulatory oversight, and risk antitrust and contract challenges if schools or third parties appear to fix compensation under the guise of compliance.[16]
The Learfield Model: Scale, Data, and Integration
At the other end of the spectrum, Learfield’s new 15-year deal with University of Southern California ("USC") highlights how legacy MMR firms are adapting to industry changes by embedding NIL into their massive revenue ecosystems.[17] Unlike Blueprint, Learfield is choosing to leverage scale, as its Fanbase platform integrates millions of fan data points across the Big Ten, driving sponsorship segmentation and fan targeting.[18] Essentially, for Learfield, NIL has become one layer of a larger revenue plan, bundled with ticketing, digital content, and corporate sales.[19]
From a legal standpoint, Learfield’s model reflects a growing convergence between schools and athletes’ intellectual property ("IP"). By facilitating co-branded content campaigns, Learfield invites questions about licensing rights, tax implications, and the enforceability of NIL contracts at scale.[20] At the same time, these partnerships exemplify a broader trend toward vertical integration. In other words, the same entity that sells stadium signage now brokers NIL campaigns, again potentially raising antitrust concerns over market concentration.[21]
MMR as a Compliance Shield and Recruiting Tool
The stakes of this structural shift are most visible in recruiting. As ESPN reported, the rev-share era has slowed commitments in the Class of 2026, with coaches now wary of promising NIL dollars that may not survive CSC review.[22] Collectives once funded splashy, multimillion-dollar packages, but now, schools must balance fixed revenue-share caps against uncertain third-party approvals.[23] Ultimately, by housing NIL within MMR-style contracts, universities outsource both operational risk and regulatory exposure, meaning MMR firms may end up serving as compliance shields.[24]
But this also transforms MMR into a recruiting tool as schools can pitch athletes on “integrated packages” (i.e., direct revenue sharing, guaranteed NIL services, and sponsor access) all wrapped within one contractual framework.[25] This contract bundling could exacerbate existing inequities between Power Four schools with strong MMR partners and smaller mid-majors who are forced to manage in-house.[26]
Risks, Rewards, and the Legal Frontier
The evolution of MMR in this context highlights three unresolved legal issues. First are contractual flexibility and stability. As seen during COVID-19, MMR contracts often include force majeure provisions or renegotiation clauses.[27] In the post-House era, sudden regulatory changes, like a court striking down CSC authority, could again destabilize revenue flows, thus requiring carefully drafted termination rights.[28]
Second is antitrust and market power. Learfield’s dominance could raise antitrust questions, particularly after its International Management Group ("IMG") merger and subsequent debt-driven renegotiations.[29] If one company controls both school IP and athlete NIL access, plaintiffs could argue the arrangement constitutes monopolistic tying or limits competition in the NIL marketplace.[30]
Lastly, we must look at labor law and employee status. Revenue sharing arguably inches athletes closer to employee classification.[31] If the courts or Congress eventually do decide to deem student-athletes as employees, MMR contracts involving athletes’ IP may require collective bargaining, which would fundamentally alter the negotiation landscape.[32]
Conclusion: A New Era of Hybrid Contracts
Revenue sharing did not kill MMR; it simply reinvented it.[33] Companies like Blueprint and Learfield are positioning themselves not as outsiders but as essential compliance partners in a legally volatile market.[34] In doing so, they have transformed MMR from a back-office sponsorship function into the front lines of NIL regulation, athlete compensation, and institutional risk management.[35]
Whether this hybridization of sorts enhances competitive balance or simply entrenches existing disparities will depend on how schools draft, enforce, and adapt their contracts in the years ahead.[36] For now, however, one thing is clear: in the post-House era, the most important contracts in college sports may no longer be television rights deals, but instead the MMR agreements that are quietly reshaping how athletes, schools, and sponsors share the same pie.[37]

Nick Briggs (staff writer) is a 2L at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law. Originally from Upstate New York, he roots for a variety of professional sports teams but none more than the rebuilding New England Patriots. He was a 1L representative for the Entrepreneurship Law Society (ELS), as well as an avid member of the Sports Law Society (SLS) and Villanova Italian-America Legal Organization (VIALO).
References:
[1] Ralph Sanchez. Arch Manning - First Game, 2023. Flickr (November 29, 2024). https://www.flickr.com/photos/ralphsanchez/54171219364/in/photolist-2qhWH9i-2qvJP7w-2qwVEdL-2qhVERY-2qwVuNY-2qvC5fD-2ke9Fyn-2qwVuNh-2qvC5aZ-2qvHWQc-2qwWpW3-2heiuq4-2qwWoSV-2qwPAym-29FS2G5-2qwVWKH-8DBcnX-2mDRt96-2qwU7Hk-2qwVEec-4Bgbuj-pjjxFQ-5qeTVn-21DuV8n-2qwVLe8-pjkYVZ-5qjfMQ-5iBS3R-2mDRsRH-2mDRsyd-2mDM3MQ-2p9i6BE-2mDMc5S-2mDRsii-8DEjkj-8xHMtG-2mDRjw1-2mDULPZ-2mDReT8-2mDSp5z-2mDUKk1-2mDVAx5-2mDSA5v-2mDUC3F-2mDLZcJ-8DEj8u-2mDVFCA-2mDLX5H-p2RtXq-2mDSkVo
[2] See Dan Murphy. Judge OK’s $2.8B Settlement. ESPN (June 6, 2025). https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/45467505/judge-grants-final-approval-house-v-ncaa-settlement (describing the settlement’s approval and revenue-sharing cap).
[3] See NCSA College Recruiting. What Is NCAA Revenue Sharing? NCSA. https://www.ncsasports.org/blog/what-is-ncaa-revenue-sharing (explaining how the policy shifts athlete compensation closer to the professional model).
[4] See Matt Brown. Where Do MMR Companies Fit in the Post-House Era? Extra Points (July 2, 2025). https://www.extrapointsmb.com/p/where-do-mmr-companies-fit-in-the-post-house-era (noting how schools are turning toward MMR firms to fill financial gaps post-House).
[5] See AJ Maestas. Negotiating College Sports Multimedia Rights Deals. Athletic Director U https://athleticdirectoru.com/articles/negotiating-college-sports-multimedia-rights-deals/ (explaining how MMR covers non-broadcast assets and structures contracts).
[6] See Id. (explaining how MMR covers non-broadcast assets and structures contracts).
[7] See Matt Brown. Here’s Why You Should Care That a Bunch of Multimedia Rights Are Being Redone. Extra Points (May 22, 2023). https://www.extrapointsmb.com/p/heres-care-bunch-multimedia-rights-redone (discussing guaranteed vs. revenue-sharing MMR models).
[8] See Daniel Libit. Inside Blueprint’s New Model. Sportico (Sept. 30, 2025). https://www.sportico.com/leagues/college-sports/2025/blueprint-sports-consulting-rev-share-oregon-state-1234872423/ (describing NIL collectives and MMR frameworks converging).
[9] See Id. (explaining Blueprint’s evolution from collective operator to MMR-style consultant).
[10]See Id. (noting Blueprint’s NIL consulting deals with Maryland and Oregon State).
[11] See Id. (detailing the $284,000 management fee and revenue-sharing terms of the OSU contract).
[12] See Id. (noting OSU can audit NIL deals and retain rights over accounts).
[13] See Id. (explaining OSU’s rights to terminate or review NIL agreements).
[14] See Id. (drawing parallels to Learfield ticketing models).
[15] See Id. (noting deals above market range require school approval).
[16] See Id. (citing CSC guardrails and compliance obligations).
[17] See Learfield. USC Selects Learfield in New 15-Year Partnership. Learfield (June 5, 2025). https://www.learfield.com/2025/06/usc-selects-learfield-in-new-15-year-partnership-to-revolutionize-revenue-generation-nil-and-fan-engagement-for-trojan-athletics-and-the-los-angeles-memorial-coliseum/ (describing USC’s partnership with Learfield across NIL, MMR, and fan engagement).
[18] See Id. (noting USC’s immediate access to 3.2 million fan profiles).
[19] See Id. (explaining Learfield’s integrated services).
[20] See Id. (noting Learfield Studios’ NIL-focused storytelling campaigns).
[21] See Matt Brown. Here’s Why You Should Care That a Bunch of Multimedia Rights Are Being Redone. Extra Points (May 22, 2023). https://www.extrapointsmb.com/p/heres-care-bunch-multimedia-rights-redone (discussing Learfield’s debt-driven contract renegotiations and market power).
[22] See Jeff Borzello. How the Rev-Share Era Is Squeezing Recruiting. ESPN (Aug. 1, 2025). https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/45873955/college-sports-revenue-sharing-shaping-high-school-basketball-recruiting-class-2026 (reporting on delayed recruiting timelines).
[23] See Id. (explaining that collective-backed NIL deals face CSC scrutiny).
[24] See Daniel Libit. Inside Blueprint’s New Model. Sportico (Sept. 30, 2025). https://www.sportico.com/leagues/college-sports/2025/blueprint-sports-consulting-rev-share-oregon-state-1234872423/ (noting Blueprint’s compliance provisions in OSU deal).
[25] See Learfield. USC Selects Learfield in New 15-Year Partnership. Learfield (June 5, 2025). https://www.learfield.com/2025/06/usc-selects-learfield-in-new-15-year-partnership-to-revolutionize-revenue-generation-nil-and-fan-engagement-for-trojan-athletics-and-the-los-angeles-memorial-coliseum/ (describing NIL and sponsorship integration for recruiting advantage).
[26] See Matt Brown. Where Do MMR Companies Fit in the Post-House Era? Extra Points (July 2, 2025). https://www.extrapointsmb.com/p/where-do-mmr-companies-fit-in-the-post-house-era (noting competitive imbalance risks for smaller schools).
[27] See AJ Maestas. Negotiating College Sports Multimedia Rights Deals. Athletic Director U. https://athleticdirectoru.com/articles/negotiating-college-sports-multimedia-rights-deals/ (explaining contract flexibility under force majeure).
[28] See Id. (noting renegotiation dynamics in downturns).
[29] See Matt Brown. Here’s Why You Should Care That a Bunch of Multimedia Rights Are Being Redone. Extra Points (May 22, 2023). https://www.extrapointsmb.com/p/heres-care-bunch-multimedia-rights-redone (discussing Learfield’s restructuring and market concentration).
[30] See Id. (noting schools’ concern over contract protections).
[31] See NCSA College Recruiting. What Is NCAA Revenue Sharing? NCSA. https://www.ncsasports.org/blog/what-is-ncaa-revenue-sharing (explaining athlete compensation structure).
[32] See Dan Murphy. Judge OK’s $2.8B Settlement. ESPN (June 6, 2025). https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/45467505/judge-grants-final-approval-house-v-ncaa-settlement (noting open question of employee classification).
[33] See Matt Brown. Where Do MMR Companies Fit in the Post-House Era? Extra Points (July 2, 2025). https://www.extrapointsmb.com/p/where-do-mmr-companies-fit-in-the-post-house-era (arguing MMR is positioned to grow in the post-House era).
[34] See Daniel Libit. Inside Blueprint’s New Model. Sportico (Sept. 30, 2025). https://www.sportico.com/leagues/college-sports/2025/blueprint-sports-consulting-rev-share-oregon-state-1234872423/ (describing Blueprint’s pivot to consulting with schools directly).
[35] See Learfield. USC Selects Learfield in New 15-Year Partnership. Learfield (June 5, 2025). https://www.learfield.com/2025/06/usc-selects-learfield-in-new-15-year-partnership-to-revolutionize-revenue-generation-nil-and-fan-engagement-for-trojan-athletics-and-the-los-angeles-memorial-coliseum/ (highlighting NIL integration with fan engagement and corporate sales).
[36] See Jeff Borzello. How the Rev-Share Era Is Squeezing Recruiting. ESPN (Aug. 1, 2025). https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/45873955/college-sports-revenue-sharing-shaping-high-school-basketball-recruiting-class-2026 (noting recruiting uncertainty in the rev-share era).
[37] See AJ Maestas. Negotiating College Sports Multimedia Rights Deals. Athletic Director U. https://athleticdirectoru.com/articles/negotiating-college-sports-multimedia-rights-deals/ (noting MMR value to universities).